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Investigation and Discretion: The Terry
Revolution at Forty (Almost)
Russell L. Weaver*
Some decisions are landmarks from the moment they are rendered.
Brown v. Board of Education,' and in particular Brown J,2 fit this
characterization. Brown II was "at once the Twentieth Century's pivotal
judicial event and the Warren Court's paradigm decision.",3 Engel v.
Vitale,4 which invalidated prayer in the public schools, set off a firestorm
of protest and societal debate.5  Gideon v. Wainwright,6 while not as
significant as Brown or Brown II, was nevertheless a "landmark"
decision because it revolutionized the criminal justice process by
extending the right to appointed counsel to indigent defendants in state
court proceedings. Finally, Miranda v. Arizona' turned confessions law
upside down by extending the privilege against self-incrimination to pre-
adversarial investigatory contexts, and requiring the police to
"Mirandize" suspects prior to custodial interrogation.
While other decisions might not be "pivotal judicial events" at the
moment of decision, they can profoundly influence the law over time.
Like bourbon and fine wine, some decisions ripen and flourish with age.
Terry v. Ohio,8 the so-called "stop and frisk" decision, is the epitome of
this latter type of decision. When Terry was decided in 1968,
* Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville,
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. Doug Rendleman, Brown II's "All Deliberate Speed" at Fifty: A Golden
Anniversary or a Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School
Desegregation Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1575, 1576 (2004).
4. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (invalidating state-imposed prayer in
public schools).
5. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (striking down the
State of Georgia's death penalty statute under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution's provision prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishment").
6. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring state-appointed counsel for indigent defendants).
7. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (requiring the reading of a Miranda warning prior to
custodial interrogation).
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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commentators would not have regarded that decision as momentous as
Brown I or Brown II. Nevertheless, Terry has dramatically reshaped
search and seizure law over time. Although the Terry holding itself was
not earth shattering (the decision did nothing more than articulate the so-
called "stop and frisk" exception to the warrant requirement), Terry's
analytical framework, which focused on a balancing of governmental
need against the intrusion on personal interests, 9 reshaped Fourth
Amendment doctrine in important respects and led to a significant
expansion of police investigative power and discretion. Today, more
than a third of a century later, Terry's influence has yet to run its course.
Each year, new decisions emerge that fly Terry's banner.'0
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has historically imposed a
warrant preference for searches, 1 and has generally assumed that
warrantless searches are unconstitutional..12  Despite the warrant
preference, the touchstone under the Fourth Amendment has always been
reasonableness, 13 and warrantless searches or seizures are invalidated
only when it is "unreasonable" to proceed without a warrant. Terry was
important because it was the first decision to "recognize[] an exception
to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must be
based on probable cause.' 4 Terry's progeny have gone on to define the
"rubric" of relationships between the citizenry and the police. In
addition to clarifying when the police can make an investigative stop of
someone on the street, at an airport, 5 or in an automobile,1 6 the Court has
used Terry's analytical framework to define when the police may force a
suspect to go to the police station for questioning or fingerprinting." In
addition, Terry has been used to establish rules governing seizures of
personal property,' 9 as well as the so-called "special needs" exception to
9. See id. at 20-21. "It is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or
seizure) entails."' Id.
10. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004); see also Illinois
v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426-27 (2004) (addressing the constitutionality of checkpoint
stops).
11. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JOHN M. BURKOFF &
CATHERINE HANCOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 61-62 (2004).
12. See id.
13. See id. at 89.
14. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979).
15. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-08 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553-57 (1980).
16. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-58 (1979).
17. See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-16.
18. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969).





This article does two things. First, it briefly traces the background
of Terry, and analyzes post-Terry developments, as well as the resulting
expansion of police discretion and power. Second, in the short space
allotted, it offers some analysis of Terry's implications for Fourth
Amendment analysis.
I. The Development of Terry Principles
In creating the stop and frisk exception, and in determining the
appropriate balance between the police and the citizenry, the Terry Court
weighed the need for the search and seizure against the level of intrusion
on the individual. 21  Although Terry did not originate the balancing
approach, 22 it was the first decision to apply that approach to police-
citizen encounters.
Terry illustrates the test's application. In Terry, the Court found a
governmental interest in "effective crime prevention and detection"
because the officer believed that a "stick-up" might be in progress. Since
robbers typically carry weapons, the officer concluded that the suspects
might be armed and dangerous. As a result, the officer, believing that
immediate action was needed, was entitled to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him or others,23 and
therefore was allowed to stop the individuals to make inquiry. When the
inquiry failed to dispel the officer's suspicions, the officer was free to
"frisk" the suspects.
Post-Terry decisions have frequently applied the need-intrusion
framework to define police-citizen relations in an array of contexts.
Many of these decisions are in line with Terry's conclusion that there is
an "entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected
to the warrant procedure., 24 In a number of post-Terry cases, the Court
20. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-34
(2002).
21. See supra note 9.
22. See Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528-32 (1967) (the
Court used this analytical approach (the need versus intrusion test) to alter the definition
of probable cause as applied to administrative inspections).
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
24. Id. at 20; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 21) ("[Tjhe search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police
officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officers in
2005]
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has not only dispensed with the warrant requirement, but it has even
dispensed with the requirement of probable cause, and held that the
police may take investigative action based on only a "reasonable
suspicion" of criminal activity. 25  The Court has defined "reasonable
suspicion" as involving "something more than an 'inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch,"' but "considerably less than proof
of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence., 26 In a few cases,
the Court has even dispensed with the "reasonable suspicion"
requirement.27
A. Motorist Stops
A number of post-Terry decisions have discussed police authority to
stop motorists. In Delaware v. Prouse,28 the Court held that the police
could not stop motorists simply to check their license and registration,29
but could stop motorists based on a "reasonable suspicion" that criminal
activity is afoot.3° Of course, a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal
activity can involve something serious (e.g., possession of an illegal
firearm), but it may also involve quite minor matters, such as the
violation of a traffic regulation.
3'
Terry has also helped create rules governing interactions during
motorist stops. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 32 the Court held that a police
officer may, as a matter of course, order the driver of a lawfully stopped
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons.").
25. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 560 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (Court felt no need to apply the need
versus intrusion test because the Court concluded that Mendenhall had not been seized.).
26. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
27. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).
28. 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979).
29. See id. at 656-63 (1979). Although the Court recognized that vehicular traffic
presents danger to life and property, and even though the Court agreed that the states
have a vital interest in ensuring that drivers are licensed and that vehicles are fit for safe
operation, the Court held that the stop was invalid, ruling that the state could use
alternative mechanisms for ensuring these ends (e.g., the police could stop motorists for
"observed violations" and could check licenses and registrations at that time). The Court
concluded that the incremental contribution of random stops was insufficient to justify
giving police the unbridled discretion to stop motorists. See id.
30. See id. at 656.
31. For example, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), two undercover
police officers were patrolling in a "high drug area" when they witnessed respondent
driving in an unusual manner (he sat for an unusually long time at a stop sign, and then
took off at a high rate of speed). The officers stopped him for a traffic violation.
Defendants eventually argued that the stop was pretextual, but the Court rejected that
argument. Id. at 809.
32. 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977).
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car to exit the vehicle. In Maryland v. Wilson,33 the Court extended this
rule to passengers. In Wilson, the Court held that the officer validly
ordered the defendant to exit the vehicle, citing the interest in officer
safety and noting that the fact that there was more than one person in the
vehicle increased the "possible sources of harm to the officer., 34 The
Court concluded that, in a situation such as the one in Wilson, the
intrusion on passengers is minimal, and the motivation of a passenger to
use violence to prevent detection of and apprehension for a crime is
great.35
The Court has also used Terry's analysis to hold that traffic
roadblocks and checkpoints are permissible even without a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.36 For example, in Michigan v. Sitz,37 the
Court upheld sobriety checkpoints at which the police stopped all
vehicles and briefly examined drivers for signs of intoxication. Despite
recognizing that the checkpoints constituted Fourth Amendment seizures,
the Court upheld the checkpoints because of the strong governmental
interest in preventing drunk driving and the slight intrusion caused by the
brief stops. 38 Likewise, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,39 the Court
upheld immigration checkpoints established close to the U.S. border,
which were designed to detect the presence of illegal aliens in
automobiles. However, in later cases, the Court limited police authority
to establish roadblocks for other purposes.4°
B. Other Police-Citizen Investigative Encounters
Terry has also been used to justify investigative stops of individuals
in a variety of other locations, including on the street and in airports;
41
33. 519 U,S. 408 (1997).
34. Id. at 413.
35. Id. at 414-15.
36. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990).
37. Id. at 447.
38. Id. at450-51.
39. 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
40. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
41. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (the Court felt no need to apply the need versus intrusion test
because the Court concluded that Mendenhall had not been seized). In United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989), the Court found a "reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity" when a suspect: (1) paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 bills;
(2) traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone number
was listed; (3) was originally destined for Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) stayed
in Miami for only forty-eight hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to
Miami takes twenty hours; (5) appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) checked none of
his luggage. A number of other cases have involved the use of these so-called drug
courier profiles. In both Royer and Mendenhall, these profiles provided the basis for the
stops. In Sokolow, the Court upheld the use of drug courier profiles, saying: "A court
2005] 1209
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post-Terry cases have sought to define the scope of police conduct
during such stops. For example, in Dunaway v. New York, the Court
held that, if the police want to pick up a suspect and take him to the
station for questioning, they must have probable cause.42 In Davis v.
Mississippi, the Court held that probable cause is also required when the
police force a suspect to go to the station for fingerprinting. 43 In Hayes
v. Florida, in dicta, the Court suggested that when fingerprinting is done
in the field as part of a brief detention, it might be justified based on only
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 4 In both Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial District Court4 5 and Brown v. Texas,46 the Court has held that
suspects can be forced to identify themselves based on merely a
"reasonable suspicion" that they are involved in criminal activity.
Terry's analysis has also been used to define the scope and length of
investigative seizures of persons and property. In United States v.
Place,47 when Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, drug
agents held the luggage for ninety minutes while they waited for a "sniff
test" by a narcotics detection dog. When the dog reacted positively, the
agents kept the bags until Monday morning (the sniff took place late on a
Friday afternoon) when they obtained a search warrant from a judge.
The subsequent search revealed cocaine. The Court recognized that
warrantless seizures of property are permissible when the police have
articulable facts suggesting that luggage may contain narcotics and that
the governmental interest in seizing the luggage briefly to pursue further
investigation is "substantial" and perhaps even "compelling" given the
suspected involvement in drug trafficking. 48 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that the seizure in Place was unconstitutional because of the
ninety-minute delay, which the Court regarded as too intrusive. 49 The
sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to
articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set
forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen
by a trained agent." Id. at 10.
42. 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979).
43. 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
44. 470 U.S. 811,817 (1985).
45. 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2458 (2004).
46. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
47. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
48. Id. at 703. The Court held that the police may seize containers without probable
cause when they seek a warrant because "the risk of the item's disappearance or use for
its intended purpose before a warrant may be obtained outweighs the interest in
possession." Id. at 701-02.
49. Based on a reasonable conclusion that a traveler's luggage contains narcotics, the
police could briefly detain the luggage for investigative purposes "provided that the
investigative detention is properly limited in scope." Id. at 706. Although a canine sniff
does not qualify as a search, but only a seizure, the Court concluded that "the police
conduct intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage as well as his
1210 [Vol. 109:4
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Court emphasized that the agents had advance notice of Place's arrival
and could have prepared for the additional investigation.50  The
additional step, of holding the bags over the weekend, was also deemed
to be unreasonable.
Other decisions have involved similar issues. In Florida v. Royer,
the Court invalidated an officer's decision to take a drug suspect to the
DEA office. 51 The Court held that removal to an office was too intrusive
and suggested that the police could have confirmed or denied their
suspicions by using a narcotics detection dog. In United States v.
Sharpe,52 the Court rejected a court of appeals decision holding that
investigative stops could last no longer than twenty minutes. The Court
concluded that there is "no rigid time" limit on Terry stops. 53  In
evaluating stops, courts must consider not only the length and
intrusiveness of the stop, but also "the law enforcement purposes to be
served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate
those purposes., 54 The issue is whether the police "diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
defendant. 5 5 "The question is not simply whether some other alternative
was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to
recognize or to pursue it."'56  In United States v. Van Leeuwen,57 the
liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary." Id. at 708. "[S]uch a seizure can
effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel
plans in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange for its return." Id.
50. The Court stated: "In short, we hold that the detention of respondent's luggage in
this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage
reasonably suspected to contain narcotics." Id. at 710.
51. 460 U.S. at 504-05.
52. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
53. Id. at 685.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 686.
56. Id. at 687. In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), DEA agents believed
that Sokolow was a drug courier. Following a brief interrogation, during which Sokolow
was unable to produce either his airline ticket or identification, Sokolow was escorted to
the DEA office at the airport, where has luggage was examined by a narcotics detection
dog. The dog alerted on one of the bags, and the agents obtained a warrant to search it.
They found no illicit drugs, but they did find several suspicious documents indicating
Sokolow's involvement in drug trafficking. The agents had the dog reexamine the
remaining luggage, and this time the dog alerted on a larger bag. By now, it was late
evening, and the police could not obtain a second warrant. They allowed Sokolow to
leave for the night, but kept his luggage. The next morning, the agents obtained a
warrant and found 1,063 grams of cocaine inside the bag. Id. at 5. Sokolow challenged
the search on the basis that the police failed to use "the least intrusive means available to
verify or dispel their suspicions that he was smuggling narcotics." Id. at 10. The Court
rejected the challenge and qualified Royer's statement about using the least intrusive
means available. Id. at 11.
57. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
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Court upheld a seizure of suspicious packages and a subsequent search.5 8
In so doing, the Court suggested that the police acted appropriately.
59
C. Special Rules for Special Contexts
Terry has also been used to create special rules relating to arrests
and the execution of warrants. In Michigan v. Summers,60 the occupant
of a house was detained while a search warrant was being executed. The
Court held that the warrant rendered the occupant sufficiently suspect to
justify his temporary seizure; the "limited intrusion[s] on the personal
security" of the person detained was justified "by such substantial law
enforcement interests" that the seizure could be made on articulable
suspicion not amounting to probable cause. 61 Likewise, in Maryland v.
62Buie, the Court upheld the search of a basement after a suspect emerged
from it during a house search. Referencing Terry, the Court upheld the
search noting the "interest of the officers in taking steps to assure
themselves that the house in which a suspect is being, or has just been,
58. In Van Leeuwen, respondent mailed two twelve-pound packages at a post office
near the Canadian border. One package was addressed to a post office box in California,
and the other to a post office box in Tennessee. Respondent declared that they contained
coins. Each package was sent by airmail and was registered and insured for $10,000.
This type of mailing did not subject them to discretionary inspection. When the postal
clerk told a policeman that he was suspicious of the packages, the policeman at once
noticed that the return address on the packages was a vacant housing area, and that the
license plates of respondent's car were Canadian. The policeman called the Canadian
police who in turn called customs officials in Seattle. Customs officials in Seattle called
both California and Tennessee and learned that both of the addressees were under
investigation for trafficking in illegal coins. A customs official thereupon obtained a
search warrant, and the packages were opened and inspected. Respondent was tried for
illegally importing gold coins. Id. at 249-50.
59. The Court stated that:
No interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by forwarding the
packages the following day rather than the day when they were deposited. The
significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the privacy of this first-class
mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or invaded until the approval of the
magistrate was obtained .... [O]n the facts of this case-the nature of the
mailings, their suspicious character, the fact that there were two packages going
to separate destinations, the unavoidable delay in contacting the more distant of
the two destinations, the distance between Mt. Vernon and Seattle-a 29-hour
delay between the mailings and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be
"unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Detention for
this limited time was, indeed, the prudent act rather than letting the packages
enter the mails and then, in case the initial suspicions were confirmed, trying to
locate them en route and enlisting the help of distant federal officials in serving
the warrant.
Id. at 253.
60. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
61. Id. at 699.
62. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and who could
unexpectedly launch an attack., 63 The Court went on to hold that "as an
incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other
spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack
could be immediately launched.' ' 64 To search farther afield, there must
"be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences
from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing
that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene., 65 The Court held that the protective sweep involved
nothing more than a cursory inspection, and should last "no longer than
is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event
no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. 66
Terry also influenced the outcome in Segura v. United States, 67 a
case in which the police unlawfully entered and occupied an apartment
for nineteen hours while they waited for a search warrant.68 The Court
held that it would have been permissible for the police to seal the
apartment from the outside and restrict entry while a warrant was
obtained, and that it was likewise permissible for the officers to occupy
the premises.69 Likewise, in Illinois v. McArthur,7 ° the Court held that
the police could temporarily detain a man while seeking a warrant to
search his trailer. 71 The Court emphasized that the police had probable
cause to believe that the trailer contained contraband, that the contraband
would be destroyed before they could obtain a warrant, and that the
police imposed only a limited restraint by preventing McArthur from re-
entering the trailer unaccompanied by officers while a search warrant
63. Id. at 333.
64. Id. at 334.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 335-36.
67. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
68. Id. at 800-01.
69. Id. at 814.
70. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
71. Id. at 331. In that case, a woman asked police to accompany her to her trailer so
that she could remove her belongings. Although her husband was inside, the officers
remained outside. When the woman emerged, she told police that her husband "had dope
in there" that he had slipped under the couch. The officer then asked the husband for
permission to search the trailer, but the husband refused. One of the officers then
remained at the trailer while the other went with the woman to obtain a search warrant.
The remaining officer prevented the man from re-entering his trailer without a police
officer. A subsequent search pursuant to warrant revealed marijuana and drug
paraphernalia. Id. at 328-29. McArthur moved to suppress the pipe, box, and marijuana
on the ground that they were the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal
of the police to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied. According to McArthur,
reentry would have permitted him to "have destroyed the marijuana." Id. at 329.
2005] 1213
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was obtained and executed.72
D. Special Needs Exception
Post-Terry cases have also used the need-intrusion test to create the
so-called "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement. Some of
these special needs permit searches cognizable under the Fourth
Amendment without requiring a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion. As the Court stated in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Van Raab:
73
[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether
it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context.
74
In Van Raab, the Court used the test to uphold a drug-testing program
that analyzed urine specimens of employees who applied for promotion
to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs, requiring them to
carry firearms or handle classified materials.75 Finally, in Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls,76 the Court upheld a high school drug testing policy for
students involved in extra-curricular activities.77  No articulable
suspicion or case was required for the test.
78
II. Some Reflections Regarding Terry and the Need-Intrusion Test
Is there reason to fear the growth and development of Terry's
progeny and the Supreme Court's aggressive use of the need-intrusion
test? As the foregoing discussion reveals, that test has significantly
altered the landscape of Fourth Amendment analysis.
A. Racial Profiling Concerns
One major concern with Terry and its progeny is that these
decisions create a significant potential for racial profiling. In a number
of cases, the Court has suggested that the police may act without a
72. Id. at 331-33.
73. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
74. Id. at 665-66.
75. Id. at 660-63, 677.
76. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
77. Id. at 826, 838.
78. Id. at 837.
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warrant and even without probable cause.7 9 In some cases, nothing more
than a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity is involved. 80
Difficulties arise because "reasonable suspicion" is a much easier
standard to satisfy than probable cause. 8' By giving police greater
latitude, Terry gives the police a freer hand to engage in racial profiling,
allowing them to harass and intimidate minority populations. The
disproportionate numbers of racial minorities with below-average
economic resources are more likely to live in crime-ridden areas than
their white counterparts, and are more likely to be stopped and frisked.
B. Does Terry Create a Slippery Slope?
An array of police practices that might have been regarded as
questionable or illegal prior to Terry are now clearly legal. Sobriety
checkpoints are, for example, permissible. Moreover, the propensity of
the Court to employ the Terry analysis has created the potential for
additional change. In the future, the Terry analysis could be used to
justify some fairly serious and significant intrusions on individual rights.
As the prior discussion reveals, Terry's analysis has slowly and
steadily eroded both the warrant presumption and the requirement of
probable cause. In a number of cases, the Court has held that the police
may conduct a search or a seizure based only on a "reasonable suspicion"
of criminal activity.82 In later cases, the Court has held that not even a
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity is required. Police can act if
the public interest is great enough and if the intrusion on the individual's
rights is not too great.83 As a result, motorists can be stopped at traffic
checkpoints simply to further the governmental interest in eradicating
drunk driving.84
A number of the decisions of the Court comprising the Terry line of
cases make much sense. Terry itself fits this characterization. In Terry,
79. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (permitting
suspicionless search based on the consent of the person searched); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (requiring that police possess a reasonable suspicion of
unlawful activity to stop a vehicle and detain its driver).
80. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
81. The Court has defined "reasonable suspicion" as involving "something more
than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' but "considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
82. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (applying this test in the
context of vehicle stops).
83. See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002)
(applying test calling for "a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on.. . Fourth
Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests").
84. See Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447-48,454 (1990).
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the policeman had reason to believe that suspects were casing a store in
preparation for a robbery.85 Since robbers usually carry weapons, he also
had reason to believe that the suspects were armed. 86  Although the
officer could have waited until the suspects began the robbery before
intervening, that course of action might have resulted in the injury of
innocent people. 7 Under the circumstances, it made sense for the officer
to have stopped the suspects to make inquiry.8 8 When the stop failed to
resolve his concerns, it made sense for the officer to conduct a limited
search-a pat down-for weapons.89 Other decisions also seem to make
sense. For example, as in Summers, when the police execute a warrant, it
makes sense to detain occupants of the house who could attempt to
thwart the search.90
Despite the reasonableness of some of the post-Terry decisions, the
need-intrusion test has troubling implications and ramifications.
Suppose, for example, that a sniper engages in a killing spree (such as
occurred in the Washington, D.C. area a few years ago), or that a serial
killer has been murdering young children (such as happened in Atlanta a
decade or so ago). In both situations, the governmental and societal
interest in apprehending the murderers would be very high, and could
theoretically be used to justify significant intrusions upon individual
liberties. How far could the police go? The Court's willingness to apply
Terry's permissive analysis makes this an open question. Could the
police establish roadblocks to try to gather information? Could they
search vehicles at the roadblocks? Could they search houses of suspects
based only on a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal involvement, or
would a warrant or probable cause be required?
These scenarios are not far fetched. The Court has already held or
suggested that roadblocks would or should be upheld in two different
contexts. In, for example, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,91 the Court
suggested that roadblocks might be permissible when necessary to thwart
terrorists or to apprehend fleeing criminals.92 In other words, the Court
85. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 7.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 22-23.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05.
91. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
92. See id. at 44:
Of course, there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement
checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some
emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. For example.., the Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock
set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal
who is likely to flee by way of a particular route. The exigencies created by
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indicated that large numbers of motorists can be stopped even though the
police do not have probable cause, or even a "reasonable suspicion," that
any particular motorist was involved in criminal activity.93
Moreover, although the Court has upheld roadblocks and other
checkpoints for limited purposes such as sobriety checks, the Court
refused to uphold drug interdiction checkpoints. In Edmond, the police
set-up drug checkpoints similar to the drunk-driving checkpoints
designed to detect illegal narcotics.94 The officer would look for signs of
impairment, conduct a plain view examination of the vehicle from the
outside, and walk a narcotics-detection dog around the outside of the
vehicle.95  In invalidating the search, the Court emphasized that
suspicionless searches and seizures are generally regarded as
unreasonable. 96 The Court distinguished the "special needs" situations
from the drug interdiction checkpoints on the basis that none of them
involved a "checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 97  For example, sobriety
checkpoints were "clearly aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed
by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways, and there was an
obvious connection between the imperative of highway safety and the
law enforcement practice at issue.98 In suggesting that license and
registration checkpoints would be valid, the Court focused on the states'
"'vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted
to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation,
and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection
requirements are being observed.' 99 The Court viewed drug interdiction
checkpoints differently because their objective was to "detect evidence
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."' 00 Even though the Court recognized
these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities
might simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a
felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that may
justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to
approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from
the general interest in crime control.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. See id. (positing police attempts to prevent an imminent terrorist attack or to
catch a dangerous fleeing felon as examples of when such analysis might apply).
94. Id. at 34-35.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id. at 37,41.
97. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38, 41.
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658).
100. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42:
We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases
have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must
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that other types of roadblocks might result in arrests for crime, the Court
viewed such checkpoints differently because they were not "designed
primarily to serve the general interest in crime control."' 1 The Court
was reluctant "to recognize exceptions to the general rule of
individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily
pursue their general crime control ends."
10 2
Nevertheless, the Terry test probably could be used to justify
roadblocks designed to seek information regarding the identity of a
sniper or serial killer. In Illinois v. Lidster,10 3 the Court upheld a
roadblock set up simply to seek witnesses and information relating to a
crime that occurred earlier in the area.10 4 In other words, motorists were
subjected to seizure even though the police had no basis for suspecting
that they were involved in the crime, or that they were implicated in any
way. 10 5 The police were simply seeking information. Utilizing the need-
intrusion test,10 6 the Court sustained the roadblocks. It concluded that the
public interest was "grave" because someone had been killed, and the
police were trying to find the killer.10 7 In addition, the stop was tailored
be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. We suggested
in Prouse that we would not credit the "general interest in crime control" as
justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. Consistent with this
suggestion, each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was
designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing
the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Because the primary
purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover




102. Id. at 43:
The detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense serves broadly
the safety of the community, and our streets would no doubt be safer but for the
scourge of illegal drugs. Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses,
however, is society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound
threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint ... was designed to
eliminate.
Id.
103. 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
104. Id. at 422, 427-28.
105. Id. at 422.
106. See id. at 426-27:
And as this Court said in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), in judging reasonableness, we look to "the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."
See also Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-455 ... (balancing these factors in
determining reasonableness of a checkpoint stop); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-564 (same).
107. Id. at 427.
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to try to find those who might have information about the crime. 108 In
addition, the stops were brief so that the intrusion was less significant.'0 9
Likewise, in Michigan v. Sitz," 0 the Court upheld sobriety
checkpoints even though the police had neither probable cause nor a
reasonable suspicion that any of the motorists being stopped were
intoxicated."' If there was no evidence of intoxication, drivers were
immediately allowed to pass the checkpoint. If intoxication was
detected, the motorist was directed to a nearby location where "an officer
would check the motorist's driver's license and car registration and, if
warranted conduct sobriety tests."' 12  Drivers who were found to be
intoxicated were arrested."13 Despite recognizing that the checkpoints
involved Fourth Amendment seizures, the Court upheld the checkpoints
because of the strong governmental interest in preventing drunk driving,
and the limited intrusion caused by the stops.' '4
Based on the holdings in Edmond, Lidster, and Sitz, it is reasonable
to expect that the Court would uphold properly constituted roadblocks
designed to unearth information necessary to apprehend a terrorist sniper
or a serial killer. The need is strong enough and the intrusion is small
enough to justify the roadblocks, assuming that the stops are relatively
brief. However, Edmond seems to suggest that the current Court would
not sustain vehicle searches conducted as a routine component of
information-gathering roadblocks.
Would the Court also uphold searches of houses without a warrant
based on something less than probable cause? The Court has held that
the police may search cars, and sometimes even houses, based only on a
reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. For example, in Michigan v.
Long, 15 the Court held that the police could search the passenger
compartment of an automobile based on an officer's observation of a
108. See id.:
The stops took place about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on the same
highway near the location of the accident, and at about the same time of night.
And police used the stops to obtain information from drivers, some of whom
might well have been in the vicinity of the crime at the time it occurred.
Id.
109. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427-28 ("Most importantly, the stops interfered only
minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. Viewed
objectively, each stop required only a brief wait in line-a very few minutes at most.
Contact with the police lasted only a few seconds.").
110. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
111. Id. at 449-50 (distinguishing authority requiring the government to demonstrate




115. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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knife in the backseat. 1 6 Long upheld such a search even though it was
not illegal to possess the knife, and even though there was no evidence
that the suspect driving the car had threatened anyone with the knife." 7
The police were allowed to assume that their safety was in danger based
upon the late hour, the rural character of the area, the fact the suspect was
intoxicated, and the presence of the knife. 18 Likewise, in Maryland v.
Buie, " 9 the Court upheld a search of the defendant's basement to ensure
that an accomplice was not present there who could launch an attack
upon the officers apprehending the defendant.' 20
However, cases like Long and Buie do not suggest that the police
have carte blanche to search suspects' homes based upon a mere
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Both cases arose in specific
contexts--emergency situations arising on the road or in a house-and
neither decision sustained wholesale police authority to enter houses to
search without a warrant or probable cause. Long involved a roadside
stop coupled with evidence that showed that the suspect was armed and
intoxicated.' 2' Although Buie upheld a search based on something less
than probable cause, the officers in that case were already legitimately in
the house. 22 In other words, neither decision goes so far as to suggest
that the police could enter a home without a warrant or probable cause
merely to search for evidence, and neither suggests that initial entry
could be based on nothing more than a "reasonable suspicion" of
involvement.
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Terry's analysis could be
used to justify some of the more severe intrusions discussed above;
routine searches conducted pursuant to roadblocks, or home searches
designed to apprehend a terrorist sniper or serial killer, could
conceivably be sanctioned under this approach. One would hope that the
Court would never interpret Terry's analytical approach so broadly, and
so far, the Court has not done so. Nevertheless, since the need versus
intrusion test involves a case-by-case approach as opposed to a bright
line rule, 123 Terry involves the courts in applying general principles (e.g.,
the "public interest" or need for a search) to varying factual situations.
Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, case-by-case analysis
116. Id. at 1049.
117. Id. at 1032, 1036.
118. Id. at 1050-51.
119. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
120. Id. at 328, 334.
121. 463 U.S. at 1050-51.
122. 494 U.S. at 328, 334.
123. Compare, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) and
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (imposing bright-line rules), with Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 238-39 (1983) (calling for case-by-case approach).
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can vary depending upon which judge applies the law to the facts. As a
result, in the hands of judges who tend to favor law-enforcement interests
over assertions of constitutional violations, the Terry need-intrusion test
creates the potential for a slippery slope that can lead to a significant
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights. Recent "special needs" cases
illustrate the slippery slope. For example, in Earls, the Court upheld
drug tests of students involved in extra-curricular activities. 24  The
alleged governmental need for the tests was nebulously stated,1 15 and the
Court downplayed the nature and extent of the intrusion. 26
III. Conclusion
Terry v. Ohio-and particularly the balancing test invoked in that
case-has led to a large-scale revision of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Prior to Terry, the Court generally applied the warrant preference in
evaluating the validity of searches and seizures. While arrests were
generally sustained without a warrant, 127 and although there were
numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement,1 28 the warrant
preference generally applied. In the brave new world after Terry, the
Court frequently dispenses with both the warrant requirement and the
probable cause requirement. Increasingly, searches and seizures are
sustained based only upon a finding of a "reasonable suspicion" that the
suspect may be involved in criminal activity.129 In some cases, the Court
dispenses altogether with any requirement of individualized suspicion
provided that there is a sufficient need or governmental interest in the
search or seizure, and that the need or interest is not outweighed by the
level of intrusion on the individual. 
30
How far the need-intrusion analysis will be pushed, and whether it
will lead to even more severe intrusions upon Fourth Amendment
freedoms, remains to be seen. In the hands of a Court that is sensitive to
the balance between governmental and individual interests, the test has
the potential to do much good. In the hands of an insensitive Court, the
Terry analysis offers much reason for concern and fear. In addition,
whether the Terry test will ultimately lead to more racial profiling is
unclear.
124. 536 U.S. at 826, 838.
125. See id. at 835-36.
126. Id. at 832-34.
127. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976).
128. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (inventory
exception); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (search incident to legal arrest
exception); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56, 158-59, 162 (1925)
(automobile exception).
129. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
130. See, e.g., Bd. ofEd. oflnd. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002).
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